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NONMAJORITY BARGAINING
ORDERS: THE ONLY EFFECTIVE
REMEDY FOR PERVASIVE
EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES DURING UNION
ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS

An employer learns that a union organizing campaign is underway at his plant. 1 He responds by discharging union activists,
imposing stricter working conditions and higher production quotas, threatening plant closure, falsifying payroll records to prevent some employees from voting for the union, and engaging in
numerous other unfair labor practices. 2 Prior to the employer's
unfair labor practices, the union has obtained authorization
cards 3 from over forty percent of the employees, but the employer's coercive actions have irreparably damaged the union's
organizing campaign. The union files unfair labor practice
charges'against the employer with the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board).• The Board admits that the possibility of
erasing the coercive effects of the employer's unfair labor practices and ensuring a fair election by the use of traditional remedies is slight. Nevertheless, although conceding their probable
ineffectiveness, the Board orders only traditional remedies, such
as a cease and desist order, reinstatement with back pay of
1. This fact situation is based on Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984).
2. The five categories of employer unfair labor practices are delineated in § 8(a) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
3. A union circulates and collects authorization cards from employees during the
course of a union organizing campaign. By signing one of these cards an employee authorizes the union to be his or her bargaining representative. See 1 SECTION OF LABOR &
EMPLOYMENT LAw, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 503-05 (2d ed. 1983).
The National Labor Relations Board generally requires that at least 30% of the employees sign authorization cards before it will hold a union certification election. See 29
C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1986).
4. The National Labor Relations Board was established by the National Labor Relations Act § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982). The Board's principal functions under the Act are
(1) to conduct secret ballot elections among employees to determine whether or not they
desire to be represented by a union and (2) to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices
committed by either an employer or a union. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
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wrongfully discharged employees, a return to the older, more lenient working conditions, and the posting of a notice assuring
the employees that the employer will commit no further unfair
labor practices.
Current Board policy forbids issuing a bargaining order 11 in
this situation, where there is no objective evidence of majority
support for a union, even though the bargaining ·order may be
the only effective remedy for extreme employer unfair labor
practices. The Board's refusal to issue nonmajority bargaining
orders (NMBOs),6 grounded in its fear of imposing a union on
unwilling employees, has left it impotent to remedy the most severe employer unfair labor practices. This Note examines arguments for and against the Board's use of NMBOs and concludes
that NMBOs are within the scope of the Board's remedial powers and should be issued in appropriate cases. Part I examines
the language and legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) 7 and contends that Congress did not expressly preclude the Board from issuing NMBOs; they are, in
fact, consistent with Congress' underlying legislative intent. Part
II analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co. 8 and argues that the Court there sanctioned the
Board's use of NMBOs. Part III discusses relevant policy considerations and concludes that NMBOs are consistent with the
Act's policies of effectuating employee free choice and of deterring the commission of unfair labor practices by employers.

5. The Board, pursuant to its broad§ lO(c) power to "take such affirmative action ...
as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]," has devised the bargaining order remedy. 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); see also 1 SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 517-22 (2d ed. 1983). As its name implies, a "bargaining
order" requires an employer to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with a union.
6. A nonmajority bargaining order is a bargaining order that is issued by the Board
even though there is no objective evidence that the union ever had the support of a
majority of the employees (i.e., even though the union has not obtained authorization
cards from a majority of the employees and has not won a certification election). An
NMBO is appropriate in cases of outrageous and pervasive employer unfair labor practices, the coercive effects of which cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional
remedies and have made the holding of a fair and reliable election impossible. See
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1969). For possible additional restrictions on the use of NMBOs, see infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
7. The National Labor Relations Act§§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
8. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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STATUTORY AUTHORITY

A crucial consideration in the debate over the propriety of
NMBOs is whether the Board has the statutory authority to issue them-a question dividing both the Board and the courts in
recent years. A tension exists within the Act between its fundamental principle of majority rule and its grant of broad remedial
authority to the Board to ensure the exercise of employee free
choice. Interpretations of the Act in other contexts and an examination of congressional intent, however, indicate that the
majority rule principle is more flexible and may be subordinated
to the Board's remedial authority to ensure employee free
choice. Therefore, NMBOs seem to be within the scope of the
Board's statutory authority.
A.

Division in Both the Board and the Courts

Whether or not the Board has the authority to issue NMBOs
has divided both the Board and the courts in recent years. In
United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Association, 9 the Board refused to issue an NMBO even though the employer had committed numerous flagrant unfair labor practices, including discriminatory discharges, threats to close the plant, coercive
interrogations of employees, and unprecedented cash bonuses to
deter support for the union. 10 The Board split, with only one
member denying the Board's authority to issue NMBOs under
any circumstances. 11 On appeal, 12 the Third Circuit held that
the Board has remedial authority to issue an NMBO in cases
where the employer has committed such outrageous and pervasive unfair labor practices that there is no reasonable possibility
9. 242 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1979)·.
10. Id. at 1031.
11. Two members of the Board stated that the Board may have the authority to issue
NMBOs, but not in the circumstances of this case. Id. at 1027-28. One member of the
Board felt that the Board could not issue an NMBO under any circumstances unless and
until Congress expressly authorized such a remedy. Id. at 1042 (Member Penello, concurring in part and dissenting in part). The other two members of the Board believed that
an NMBO should be issued in this case and in any case where the employer's misconduct rendered an accurate determination of majority support impossible. Id. at 1035
(Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980).
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that a free and unc;:oerced election can be held. 13 On remand, the
Board, for the first time, issued an NMBO. 14
The Board again issued an NMBO in Conair Corp., 111 as a
remedy for an employer's extreme and pervasive unfair labor
practices. The employer had made numerous threats of plant
closure and loss of benefits, engaged in coercive interrogations of
employees, and had unlawfully discharged striking employees. 16
A majority of the Board, reiterating the standard endorsed by
the Third Circuit in United Dairy Farmers, held that an NMBO
should issue wherever an employer's unfair labor practices completely foreclosed the possibility of a fair election. 17 Two members of the Board dissented on this issue because they felt that
the Board did not have the authority to issue NMBOs under any
circumstances. 18 On appeal, 19 however, the D.C. Circuit reversed,
holding that the Board did not have the authority, under any
circumstances, to issue NMBOs. 20 The dissent would permit
NMBOs, at least in cases such as this one, where it was reasonably likely that the union would have gained majority support in
a coercion-free atmosphere. 21
Finally, in Gourmet Foods, Inc., 22 the Board overruled its
Conair decision and held that it would not, under any circumstances, issue an NMBO. 23 One member of the Board dissented
and, consistent with the Board's Conair decision, would have
held the Board to have statutory authority to issue an NMBO in
exceptional unfair labor practice cases. 24
Both the Board and the courts have had difficulty deciding
whether or not NMBOs are a proper remedy under the Act. The
Board currently follows the D.C. Circuit's position that NMBOs
are not within its remedial power, even though the Third Cir13. Id. at 1069.
14. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772 (1981). The case was heard
only by Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins and Zimmerman.
15. 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982).
16. Id. at 1189-90.
17. Id. at 1194.
18. Id. at 1195 (Chairman Van de Water, concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 1198-99 (Member Hunter, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
20. The majority would not, "[w)ithout a clear direction from Congress, ... remedy
one possible injustice by taking the substantial chance of imposing another." Id. at 1383.
21. Id. at 1399 (Wald, J., dissenting).
22. 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984). For a description of the factual situation in Gourmet
Foods, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
23. Id. at 583. In a concurring opinion, Member Dennis stated that she would not
issue an NMBO without clear direction from Congress. Id. at 588.
24. Id. at 588-89 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting).
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cuit's decision. to the contrary in United Dairy Farmers still
stands. 211 An independent in-depth examination of the relevant
portions of the Act is thus warranted.

B.

Tension in the Act

NMBOs require an employer to bargain with a union in cases
where the Board determines that the employer's "outrageous"
and "pervasive" unfair.labor practices have made the holding of
a fair election impossible and that the union would have won the
election "but for" the employer's unfair labor practices. 26 Section lO(c) of the Act empowers the Board, upon a finding that
an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices, to "take such
affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of [the
Act]." 27 The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he Board's [section lO(c) remedial] power is a broad discretionary one, subject
to limited judicial review." 28 A Board order will therefore be left
undisturbed "unless it can be shown that the order is a patent
attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be
said to effectuate the policies of the Act. " 29 The policies of the
25. Section 10(0 of the Act provides for appellate court review of Board decisions.
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board may obtain judicial review of the
order (1) in the Court of Appeals for the.District of Columbia or (2) in the Circuit where
the unfair labor practice allegedly took place, where the person resides, or where the
person transacts business. The appellate court has the power to enforce, modify, or set
aside, in whole or in part, the order of the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1982).
26. Most proponents of NMBOs would limit their use to situations where the Board
reasonably determines that the union would have obtained the support of a majority of
the employees in a coercion-free environment. See, e.g., Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78
HARV. L. REv. 38, 138 (1964); Golub, The Propriety of Issuing Gissel Bargaining Orders
Where the Union Has Never Attained a Majority, 29 LAB. L.J. 631, 639-40 (1978); Comment, United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Association: NLRB Bargaining Orders in the
Absence of a Clear Showing of a Pro-Union Majority, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 840, 851 (1980).
By conditioning the issuance of an NMBO on the satisfaction of this "but for" test, the
Board would best ensure compliance, at least in theory, with the Act's underlying principle of majority rule.
27. Section lO(c) of the Act reads in relevant part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in
any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person
to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of ·this subchapter.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
28. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964).
29. Id. (quoting Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1942)).
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Act, set forth in section 1, include the encouragement of collective bargaining and the protection of employees' rights to organize and select representatives of their own choosing. 30 NMBOs
therefore seem to fall within the Board's broad discretionary
power under section lO(c) because, so long as applied in accordance with the "but for" standard, they further the Act's policy
of protecting employees' rights to select freely their collective
bargaining representatives.
One could argue, however, that NMBOs do not further, and
indeed violate, a fundamental policy of the Act. 31 Section 9(a) of
the Act provides that "[r]epresentatives designated or selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees." 32 Imposition of an NMBO seems to violate this
principle of majority rule because, by definition, an NMBO is
issued only in the absence of objective evidence of majority support for the union. The union in this situation has therefore not
been "designated or selected" by a majority of the employees.
The Supreme Court has limited the Board's section l0(c) remedial powers when their exercise would "violate [a] fundamental
premise on which the Act is based. " 33 Legislators have stressed
the importance of majority rule to the concept of collective bargaining during the legislative debates surrounding the passage of
30. Section 1 of the Act reads in relevant part:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 u.s.c. § 151 (1982).
31. See, e.g., Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1381-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 583 (1984); Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1195
(1982) (Chairman Van de Water, concurring in part and dissenting in part); United
Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1041 (1979) (Chairman Fanning and
Member Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hunter, Conair: Minority
Bargaining Orders Usher in 1984 at NLRB, 33 LAB. L.J. 571, 577-78 (1982); Comment,
Gissel I Bargaining Orders: Employer Deterrence or Employee Protection?, 36 BAYLOR
L. REV. 877, 897-900 (1984); Note, Representative Bargaining Orders: A Time for
Change, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 950, 969 (1982).
32. Emphasis added. Section 9(a) of the Act reads in relevant part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
33. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
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the Act. s• Thus, one could conclude that NMBOs violate the
Act's fundamental premise of majority rule and therefore fall
outside the scope of the Board's remedial powers. 811 A more
searching examination of the Act's majority rule principle, however, reveals that this view is erroneous.

C. Interpretations of the Act m Other Contexts
Although the principle of majority rule is an important policy
of the Act, it is not inviolable and may be balanced against the
Act's other policies. 88 In a number of circumstances, neither the
Board nor the courts require evidence of actual majority support
for a union at all times. For example, the Board conclusively
presumes that a union has majority support during its certification year 87 and after voluntary recognition. 88 The rationale for
this presumption is that once a collective bargaining relationship
34. Senator Wagner, the sponsor of the Act, stated that "democracy in industry must
be based upon the same principles as democracy in government. Majority rule, with all
its imperfections, is the best protection of workers' rights, just as it is the surest guaranty
of political liberty that mankind has yet discovered." 79 CONG. REC. 7571 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935,
at 2337 (1949).
Senator Wagner also commented that "collective bargaining can be really effective
only when workers are sufficiently solidified in their interests to make one agreement
covering all. This is possible only by means of majority rule." Hearings on S. 1958 Before
the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1935), reprinted in
1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1419
(1949).
On another occasion, Senator Wagner stated that, "collective bargaining means majority rule." 79 CONG. REc. 7565 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2336 (1949).
35. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 592 (1984) (Member Zimmerman, dissenting); Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1193 (1982); United Dairy Farmers
Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1028 (1979); Bok, supra note 26, at 134; Comment,
supra note 31, at 895-96; Note, supra note 31, at 967-68.
37. In order to give collective bargaining a chance to function and to stabilize industrial relations, the Board, with Supreme Court approval, requires that a certified union's
majority status be honored for at least one year. Absent unusual circumstances, an employer must recognize a union for the entire certification year even if it has evidence that
the union has lost its majority status. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); 1 SEC·
TION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 354-55
(2d ed. 1983).
.
38. An employer may voluntarily agree to recognize a union as its employees' exclusive bargaining representative if the union has majority status at the time. Such voluntary recognition will bar a decertification election for a reasonable time, even if the union
subsequently loses the support of a majority of the employees. See Keller Plastics E.,
Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966); 1 SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW. AM. BAR Ass'N,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 355-57 (2d ed. 1983).
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is established, by whatever method, it should receive a fair
chance to function. 39 This compromise of the majority rule principle is justified and outweighed by the fact that this presumption furthers the Act's fundamental policy of encouraging collective bargaining. Similarly, although NMBOs technically may
compromise the majority rule principle, they are justified because they further the Act's fundamental policy of protecting
employees' rights to select freely their collective bargaining representatives. Section 1 of the Act mentions both of these policies, but not the majority rule principle." 0 Thus, NMBOs, like
the certification year and voluntary recognition rules, should not
be prohibited merely because they may technically compromise
the majority rule principle.
Other policies of the Act also outweigh the majority rule principle. For example, the Board may order an employer to bargain
after a union's loss of majority status if the employer has committed extensive unfair labor practices.4 1 Furthermore, the
Board, without inquiry into majority status, may revoke the certification of a union as a remedy for the union's unfair labor
practices. 411 These cases demonstrate the Board's power to devise
remedies to combat either employer or union unfair labor practices that contradict objective evidence of the apparent wishes of
the majority of the employees. The Board's authority to remedy
unfair labor practices appears to trump the majority rule principle. The majority rule principle should therefore not bar the use
of NMBOs by the Board, particularly because NMBOs, by definition, are issued in cases where they are the only effective
remedy. 43

D.

Congressional Intent

An examination of congressional intent confirms that the majority rule principle does not prohibit the use of NMBOs by the
39. See Brooks, 348 U.S. at 100; Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. at 587.
40. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text; see also Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 702 (1944) (first Supreme Court case holding a bargaining order justified when an
employer's unfair labor practices caused the loss of a union's cardholder majority status).
42. See Independent Metal Workers Union, Local No. 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (rescinding a union's otherwise valid certification because the
union executed racially discriminatory contracts and administered them in a manner
which tended to perpetuate racial discrimination in employment, an unfair labor practice
under § 8(b)(2) of the Act).
43. See supra note 6.
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Board. Statements in the legislative debates surrounding the
passage of the Act, which stressed the importance of the principle of majority rule, do not indicate that Congress intended to
withhold the power to issue NMBOs from the Board. These
statements show only that Congress felt that majority rule
should be the usual mechanism by which employees choose or
reject their union."" Congress adopted this principle to prevent
employers from weakening or avoiding collective bargaining altogether by bargaining with individuals, with company-dominated
unions, or with unions only on the basis of proportional representation. 411 No evidence suggests that the majority rule principle was intended to be superior to other policies embodied in the
Act or to limit in any way the Board's section lO(c) remedial
powers. 48
Although one could argue that section 7 of the Act prohibits
the Board from issuing NMBOs, 47 an examination of the legislative history of that section contradicts such a conclusion. Section
7, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 48 explicitly states that
employees "shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
44. Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-44 (1935), reprinted in l NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1419-20 (1949); Hearings on H.R. 6288
Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1935), reprinted in 2
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2490-92
(1949); Debates on S. 1958 in Senate, 79 CONG. REC. 7571 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2336-37 (1949);
see also Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1395 (Wald, J., dissenting); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270
N.L.R.B. 578, 591-92 (1984) (Member Zimmerman, dissenting); Recent Case, Conair
Corp. v. NLRB: Limits on the Power of the NLRB to Remedy Employer Unfair Labor
Practices, 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 813, 826-27 (1984).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); see Recent Case, supra note 45, at 827. The situation
here is easily distinguished from the one in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970),
where the Supreme Court stated that the Board's § lO(c) powers could not be exercised
in such a way as to violate a fundamental premise of the Act. The fun_damental premise
being violated in H.K. Porter was freedom of contract. H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 108.
Section 8(d) of the Act states that the obligation to engage in collective bargaining "does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The Act, therefore, expressly prohibits interference with the parties' freedom of contract. In addition, overwhelming evidence in the legislative history
demonstrates that Congress intended to preclude the Board from intruding into the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements. H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 104-06.
Thus, unlike the case with the majority rule principle, both the clear language of the Act
and the legislative history prohibit compromising the principle of freedom of contract.
47. See, e.g., Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1382; Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. at
584-85 (1984); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1040-41 (1979)
(Member Penello, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 140 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1982)).
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such [concerted] activities."'9 A House Report seems to indicate
that legislators sought to preclude the Board from imposing its
choice on the employees: the Board was to respect and enforce
the choice actually made by the employees, whether for or
against a union. 110 The legislative history of this amendment to
section 7, however, reveals that it was added to prevent the
Board from condoning various forms of union coercion of employees to join concerted activities, and not to limit the Board's
section lO(c) remedial powers. 111
Finally, although one might contend that Congress would have
explicitly provided for exceptions to the principle of majority
rule if any were intended, H an examination of the legislative history of the Act again contradicts such a conclusion. Congress
made one explicit exception to the majority rule principle: section S(f). It provides that a· construction industry employer does
not commit an unfair labor practice by signing a collective bargaining agreement with a union before the union has established
majority employee support. 113 Because Congress did not explic49. Section 7 of the Act reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organizatio~, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 u.s.c. § 157 (1982).
50. This report stated that the Taft-Hartley amendment:
assures that when the law states that employees are to have the rights guaranteed in section 7; the Board will be prevented from compelling employees to
exercise such rights against their will .... In other words, when Congress grants
to employees the right to engage in specified activities, it also means to grant
them the right to refrain from engaging therein if they do not wish to do so.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947).
51. A House Report stated that the amendment:
provides that employees are also to have the right to refrain from joining in
concerted activities with their fellow employees if they choose to do so. Taken in
conjunction with the provisions of section B(b)(l) ... , wherein it is made an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7, it is apparent that
many forms and varietes [sic] of concerted activities which the Board, particularly in its early days, regarded as protected by the act will no longer be treated
as having that protection, since obviously persons who engage in or support unfair labor practices will not enjoy immunity under the act.
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT. 1947, at 543-44 (emphasis added).
Therefore, this amendment to § 7 apparently was intended primarily to protect employees from union coercion, and not from remedies devised by the Board.
52. See Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
53. Section 8(0 re~_ds in relevant part:
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itly authorize an exception to the principle of majority rule as a
remedy for gross unfair labor practices, opponents of NMBOs
argue that they are impermissible. 114
Examination of the legislative history, however, diminishes
the value of section 8(f) as evidence of congressional intent to
legislate only explicit exceptions to the principle of majority
rule. 1111 The congressional reports reveal that Congress considered
section 8(f) consistent with, and not an exception to, the majority rule principle. 118 Thus, because Congress did not expressly enact any substantive exceptions to the majority rule principle,
section 8(f) provides no real evidence of an intention to bar any
i~plicit exceptions to the rule.
On the contrary, one can argue that when Congress wanted to
limit the Board's authority it did so explicitly. 117 For example,
section 9(b) expressly limits the Board's authority to designate
bargaining units when certain types of employees are involved. 118
Because Congress did not expressly limit the Board's broad and
discretionary section lO(c) remedial powers, no congressional intent to prohibit the Board from issuing NMBOs appears to
exist.
It shall not be an unfair labor practice ... for an employer engaged primarily in
the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged ... in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of which building and ·construction employees are members [because] the
majority status of such labor organization has not been established under the
provisions of [§ 9 of this Act] prior to the making of such agreement ....
29

u.s.c. § 158(0 (1982).
54. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.

55. See Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1396 (Wald, J., dissenting); Recent Case, supra
note 45, at 828-29.
56. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1959). Employment relationships in
the construction industry are generally too brief to allow a representation election to be
held. Construction industry employers, however, typically hire from union halls where a
majority are union members. Therefore, a majority of the workers will have already expressed their support for the union, making the § 8(0 "exception" to the principle of
majority rule consistent with it.
57. See Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). This section prevents the Board from designating as a
bargaining unit a group of both professional and nonprofessional employees, unless a
majority of the professional employees votes to be included in the unit. It also prevents
the Board from designating a bargaining unit to include, together with other employees,
guards hired to protect the employer's interests. See also H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397
U.S. 99 (1970), discussed supra note 46 (holding that the Board had no authority to
compel agreement on substantive terms of a contract because § 8(d) of the Act expressly
prohibits this practice).
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SUPREME COURT APPROVAL

The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether or not NMBOs are within the Board's remedial
powers. 119 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 60 however, the Court,
in dicta, referred to the Board's possible use of NMBOs. The
favorable manner in which they were discussed indicates at least
implicit Court approval of NMBOs.
In Gissel, the issue before the Court was whether or not a bargaining order was an appropriate remedy in cases where objective evidence of a union's majority status61 once existed but subsequently had been dissipated by ·extensive employer unfair
labor practices. The Court held that this type of bargaining order, now known as a "Gissel bargaining order," is an appropriate
remedy when the employer's unfair labor practices have made a
fair election unlikely. 62 The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit,
which had held that authorization cards were unreliable indicators of employee sentiment and that, in effect, the Board could
issue a bargaining order only after the union had won a certification election. 63 The Court, however, noted that the area of disa59. See 1 SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 517-22 (2d ed. 1983).
60. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Gissel was a consolidation of four cases. Three of these cases
were appealed from the Fourth Circuit: NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th
Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); and General Steel Prods.
v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968). In these cases, the Fourth Circuit refused to
enforce bargaining orders issued by the Board. The employers had committed unfair
labor practices and had refused to bargain with the union when presented with union
authorization cards signed by a majority of the employees. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that the employers had not violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to bargain
with the union, on the ground that authorization cards were such unreliable indicators of
the desires of the employees that an employer was justified in withholding recognition
pending the result of a certification election. The fourth case was appealed from the
First Circuit: NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). In this case, the First
Circuit upheld a bargaining order issued by the Board under circumstances very similar
to the Fourth Circuit cases.
61. A union has objective evidence of majority status when it collects signed union
authorization cards from a majority of the employees. See supra note 3.
62. The Court held that because authorization cards can be reliable evidence that the
union once had majority status, a bargaining order, by restoring the status quo, is a
permissible remedy for employer unfair labor practices likely to have dissipated this majority and impeded the election process. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 606-07, 614.
63. Id. at 585-86. The Fourth Circuit also indicated that a bargaining order might be
appropriate in cases where the union's majority status was otherwise undisputed. Furthermore, NMBOs may be issued. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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greement between its position and that of the Fourth Circuit
was not large as a practical matter. 6 '
The Fourth Circuit had left open the possibility of imposing
an NMBO in exceptional cases. These extreme cases would be
marked by outrageous and pervasive employer unfair labor practices, the effects of which could not be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, thus making a fair and reliable
election unlikely. 611 The area of disagreement between the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit-whether authorization
cards constituted sufficient evidence of a pro-union majority to
support a bargaining order66-was not large as a practical matter
because the Fourth Circuit had left open the possibility of imposing an NMBO. An NMBO, like a Gissel bargaining order,
would be issued even though the union had never won a certification election. Therefore, the Supreme Court, by citing the
Fourth Circuit's tentative approval of NMBOs to demonstrate
that their views really were not that far apart, appeared to sanction the Board's use of NMBOs. 67
Further support for this argument may be found in two other
passages in Gissel. First, the Court noted that the employer's
unfair labor practices in the Sinclair case, 68 one of the four cases
consoiidated in Gissel, were so coercive that a bargaining order
would have been necessary to repair their unlawful effects even
in the absence of a section 8(a)(5) violation. 69 At the time of the
64. The Court stated that "(d]espite our reversal of the Fourth Circuit below ... on
all major issues, the actual area of disagreement between our position here and that of
the Fourth Circuit is not large as a practical matter." Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613.
65. The Court explained:
While refusing to validate the general use of a bargaining order in reliance on
cards, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless left open the possibility of imposing a
bargaining order, without need of inquiry into majority status on the basis of
cards or otherwise, in "exceptional" cases marked by "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices. Such an order would be an appropriate remedy for
those practices ... if they are of "such a nature that their coercive effects cannot
be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the result that a
fair and reliable election cannot be had."
Id. at 613-14 (1969) (emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386
F.2d 562, 570 (4th Cir. 1967)).
66. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 31, at 889; Comment, supra note 26, at 844-45;
Note, supra note 31, at 967. But see, e.g., Golub, supra note 26, at 636-37; Hunter, supra
note 31, at 576-77.
68. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
69. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 615 (1969). Section 8(a)(5) provides
that "[i)t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of [§ 9(a)]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). For a discussion of § 9(a) and its implications,
see supra notes 32-58 and accompanying text.
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Gissel decision, a union established a section 8(a)(5) violation, in
this context, by showing that it had achieved majority status
and that the employer had rejected its bargaining request in bad
faith. 70 A showing that the employer had committed serious unfair labor practices which tended to interfere with the election
process, 71 an element clearly present in the Sinclair case, satisfied the bad faith requirement. In fact, precisely because this element was so strong, the Court believed that no section 8(a)(5)
violation was necessary to justify a bargaining order. 72 The
Court thus suggested that the other element, achieving majority
status, was not required and, therefore, that an NMBO would
have been proper in the Sinclair case. 73
Second, the Gissel Court indicated the seriousness of its endorsement of NMBOs immediately following its approval of the
Fourth Circuit's statements leaving open the possibility of issuing NMBOs. 74 The Court added that, "[t]he Board itself ... has
long had a similar policy of issuing a bargaining order, in the
absence of a § 8(a)(5) violation or even a bargaining demand,
when that was the only available, effective remedy for substantial unfair labor practices."711 The Court referred to the policy of
issuing a bargaining order when an employer's unfair labor practices had undermined a union's cardholder majority, even
though the employer had not violated the duty to bargain with
the union. 76 In other words, the Board had placed great weight
on the remedial policies of the Act and had regularly issued bargaining orders in cases of severe employer unfair labor practices,
even when the union had never won a certification election. The
same emphasis on the remedial policies of the Act underlies
NMBOs, and the Court, by analogizing to this accepted Board
70. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 582-83.
71. See id. at 594; 1 SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 497-98 (2d ed. 1983).
72. The Court noted that, in Sinclair, the employer's threats of reprisal were so coercive that the Board "did not have to make the determination called for in [cases involving less severe unfair labor practices] that the risks that a fair rerun election might not
be possible were too great to disregard the desires of the employees already expressed
through the cards." Gissel, 395 U.S. at 615.
73. See Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J., dissenting); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 590 (1984) (Member Zimmerman, dissenting); Comment, supra note 31, at 890. But see Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B.
578, 585 n.43 (1984); Comment, supra note 31, at 891 (arguing that the Court was dispensing with the bad faith requirement, not the cardholder majority requirement).
74. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
75. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
76. The Gissel Court expressly cited J.C. Penney Co. v. NLRB, 384 F.2d 479 (10th
Cir. 1967) and United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1967) as examples
of this Board policy. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614.
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practice, appeared also in this way to sanction the Board's use of
NMBOs. 77
Disagreement persists, however, as to the extent to which the
Court endorsed NMBOs in Gissel. Some have argued that the
Court's statements in Gissel regarding NMBOs are mere dicta78
and therefore should not be given much weight. 79 Furthermore,
the Court expressly limited its holding to bargaining orders
where, as in the case before it, the employer's unfair labor practices were less severe, and a cardholder majority at one time had
been shown. 80 This argument fails to recognize, however, that
Supreme Court dicta play an important role in shaping public
policy. The Board and the lower courts often look to the Court's
dicta for guidance. 81 In fact, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all interpreted Gissel as implicitly endorsing NMBOs. 82 It is therefore
likely that the Court carefully considered its statements regarding NMBOs and the probable impact they would have in guiding
future Board policy.
77. See Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. at 590 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting);
Comment, supra note 26, at 845. But see Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1380 n.83 (arguing
that this statement shows the Court's reference to NMBOs to be only casual).
78. The union had been able to show that it had obtained a cardholder majority at
one time in all four of the cases consolidated in Gissel. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 580, 587. The
Court's statements concerning NMBOs may therefore be regarded as dicta.
79. See, e.g., Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Gourmet
Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 585 (1984); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242
N.L.R.B. 1026, 1039 (1979) (Member Penello, concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Hunter, supra note 31, at 577; Comment, supra note 31, at 889-90, 894; Note, supra note
31, at 969 n.98.
80. The Court stated, "The only effect of our holding here is to approve the Board's
use of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices
which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede
the election processes." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
81. Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. at 589 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting).
82. See, e.g., NLRB v. Windsor Indus., 730 F.2d 860, 864 (2d Cir. 1984); Ona Corp. v.
NLRB, 729 F.2d 713, 720 (11th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Maidsville Coal Co., 693 F.2d 1119,
1121-22 (4th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Berger Transfer & Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679, 693 (7th
Cir. 1982); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1066 (3d Cir.
1980); Chromalloy Mining & Minerals Corp. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120, 1129 (5th Cir.
1980); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 554 F.2d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Lou De Young's Mkt. Basket, Inc., 430 F.2d 912, 914 (6th Cir. 1970). But see Conair
Corp., 721 F.2d at 1381 (concluding that the most that can be said is that the Gissel
Court left open the NMBO issue). United Dairy Farmers and Conair Corp. are the only
cases that discuss in depth the reasoning behind their interpretations of the Gissel dictum. The arguments advanced in these cases have been discu5!led throughout Part II of
this Note. For a discussion of the relationship between the Board and the federal courts,
see supra note 25.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

NMBOs, in addition to being consistent with the language,
legislative history, and Supreme Court interpretations of the
Act, further the Act's underlying policy goals. 83 NMBOs help
both to ensure employee freedom of choice and to deter employer unfair labor practices.
A.

Employee Freedom of Choice

When an employer's outrageous and pervasive unfair labor
practices are so coercive as to make a fair and reliable election
impossible, the true wishes of the majority of the employees remain indeterminate. 84 Through the careful application of the
NMBO remedy, however, the Board should be able to predict
with reasonable accuracy and effectuate what the true uncoerced
wishes of the majority of the employees would have been "but
for" the employer's unfair labor practices. The Board could develop guidelines in two areas to ensure that it applies the
NMBO remedy in a manner most consistent with the Act's policy of effectuating employee free choice. First, the Board should
issue NMBOs only in cases involving certain types of highly coercive employer unfair labor practices, such as discriminatory
discharges or clear threats of retaliation. 811 By restricting the use
of NMBOs to remedy only those employer unfair labor practices
likely to have led to a significant loss of support for the union,
the Board would ensure that the remedy addresses an actual loss
of employee support for the union caused by the employer's unfair labor practices. Second, NMBOs should be issued only in
cases where the union can show that a substantial proportion,
perhaps thirty percent, of the employees had signed authorization cards prior to the employer's unfair labor practices. 86 By
83. These policy goals are set forth in § 1 of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see
supra note 30.
84. Because the employer's unfair labor practices have interfered with the free expression of the employees' views, no objective evidence exists of what the employees'
true wishes regarding union representation would have been "but for" the employer's
coercive actions. See Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1399-1400 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Wald, J., dissenting); Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1193 (1982); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1034 (1979) (Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bok, supra note 26, at 138.
85. See Bok, supra note 26, at 138.
86. Id.
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restricting the use of NMBOs to cases where the union at one
time had achieved significant employee support, the Board
would help ensure that a majority of the employees would have
supported the union "but for" the employer's unfair labor practices and, therefore, that the NMBO is consistent with the Act's
policy of effectuating employee free choice.
One empirical study, the "Getman study,"87 purports to show
that employer unfair labor practices have no significant impact
on employee votes in union certification elections. 88 If this
study's conclusions are true, then a strong argument could be
made that NMBOs not only are unnecessary but also would consistently interfere with employee free choice. 89 The Getman
study has been severely criticized,90 however, and its data have
even been used to support the opposite conclusion, that employer unfair labor practices significantly reduce the pro-union
vote. 91 In addition, another independent study found employer
unfair labor practices to have a pronounced negative effect on
union organizing and on the ultimate election outcome. 92 Thus,
because employer unfair labor practices are likely to have a material impact on employee votes, NMBOs remain a necessary re87. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW
AND REALITY (1976).
88. This study analyzed 31 union certification elections and concluded that employer
unfair labor practices do not persuade employees to vote against union representation.
The authors therefore suggest the elimination of the bargaining order as a remedy for
unlawful election campaigning by employers. Id. at 154. Cf. Flanagan, NLRA Litigation
and Union Representation, 38 STAN. L. REv. 957, 981-88 (1986) (arguing that a decision
to unionize is influenced significantly more by general economic conditions than by employer unfair labor practices).
89. A union loses a certification election, according to the Getman study's view, because most of the. employees truly do not want to be, and never did want to be, represented by the union. An NMBO therefore would impose a union on the employees
against their true wishes. See Recent Decision, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 780, 797 (1981)
(discussing United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB).
90. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1782-87 (1983) (contending that the Getman
study actually showed that employer unfair labor practices reduced the pro-union vote,
though the study's authors claimed that these results were statistically insignificant, and
further arguing that the study's research methods were flawed).
91. One analyst used this data to estimate that severe employer unfair labor practices
reduced the number of pro-union votes by 15 percent. W. Dickens, Union Representation Elections: Campaign and Vote (Oct. 1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Inst. of Technology) (cited in Weiler, supra note 90,
at 1784-86 & nn.50-55, 59-60).
92. These researchers found that unlawful employer opposition, as measured by the
average number of unfair labor practice charges filed against employers per election, had
a significant negative effect on union organizing. D. ELLWOOD & G. FINE, THE IMPACT OF
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS ON UNION ORGANIZING (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 1116, 1983) (cited in Weiler, supra note 90, at 1786 n.61).
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medial device and, if carefully applied by the Board, would further the Act's policy of ensuring employee freedom of choice.
Even if the Board occasionally errs in its calculations, however, and orders an employer to bargain with a union that would
not have had the support of a majority of the employees, the
adverse effects on employee freedom of choice would be minimaL First, it is quite unlikely that an NMBO would have the
effect of forcing any employee to join the union against his will.
Employees would be compelled to join a union only if a union
security clause93 is negotiated. But a union is unlikely to be able
to pressure an employer who violates the law to resist unionization into making this significant concession. 94 Second, NMBOs
are only temporary and, after a reasonable period of time has
passed, the employees are free to vote out the union. 011 Finally, it
is quite likely that the union will try to negotiate a contract satisfactory to the majority of the employees, because it will have
to win their support in order to survive as their exclusive representative in the long-term. 96
Furthermore, NMBOs do not interfere with employee free
choice significantly more than do Gissel bargaining orders,
which have the Supreme Court's explicit approval. 97 Even where
a cardholder majority at one time has been shown, opinions or
the composition of the workforce may have changed since the
cards were signed and collected; employees may have signed the
cards in a "go along" mood, with the intent later to cast a secret
ballot the other way; or some of the employees may have misunderstood the effect of signing the cards. 98 The fact that the
union at one time had a cardholder majority, the only relevant
factor distinguishing a Gissel bargaining order from an NMBO,
93. A union security clause requires all employees covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, as a condition of employment, to obtain and maintain membership in the
union. See 2 SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAw 1365 (2d ed. 1983).
94. Bok, supra note 26, at 135.
95. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613 (1969) ("There is, after all,
nothing permanent in a bargaining order, and if, after the effects of the employer's acts
have worn off, the employees clearly desire to disavow the union, they can do so by filing
a representation petition."); Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Wald, J., dissenting); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 592 & nn. 27-28 (1984)
(Member Zimmerman, dissenting); Golub, supra note 26, at 640; Note, supra note 31, at
968.
96. Bok, supra note 26, at 135; see also Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. at 592 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting).
97. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
98. See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1034 (1979) (Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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thus is not necessarily a significant.indi~lltor of what the current
employee voting preference would have been "but for" the employer's unfair labor practices. 99 Therefore, NMBOs appear to
offer no less protection to employee free choice than Gissel bargaining orders, which have attained widespread acceptance. 100
Finally, whatever minimal harm NMBOs may occasionally
work on employee free choice is outweighed by the fact that they
are the only effective remedy for severe employer unfair labor
practices. By definition, NMBOs are issued only in cases where
the "coercive effects [of employer unfair labor practices] cannot
be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with
the result that a fair and reliable election cannot be had." 101
Traditional remedies are likely to be ineffective in these more
serious cases because "there are many workers whose apprehensions cannot be allayed by notices posted in the plant or by the
possibility of reinstatement and backpay at some future
date." 102 Some have argued that other extraordinary remedies,
particularly the section lO(j) injunction,1°3 would be just as effective as NMBOs. 10• The section lO(j) injunction, however, is a
doubtful alternative to NMBOs, especially considering the
courts' reluctance to grant them and the historical practice of
issuing injunctive relief during organizing campaigns only on a
-99. Cf. Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome:
An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel
Decision, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 87, 137 (1984) (concluding that authorization cards from at
least 62.5% of the employees were needed before the union stood a better than even
chance of actually winning the representation election).
100. But see, e.g., Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 584-85 (1984); Conair
Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1196-97 (1982) (Chairman Van de Water, concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Hunter, supra note 31, at 577-78; Comment, supra note 31, at
913-14; Recent Decision, supra note 89, at 798. These administrators and authors contend that NMBOs, unlike Gissel bargaining orders, do not restore the status quo. Therefore, strictly speaking, NMBOs are not a remedial measure, but a punitive measure, and
arguably are outside the scope of the Board's authority.
101. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969) (quoting NLRB v. S.S.
Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570 (4th Cir. 1967)).
102. Bok, supra note 26, at 135-36.
103. Section lO(j) of the Act provides that "[t]he Board shall have power ... to
petition [a) United States district court . . . for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court ... shall have jurisdiction
to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and
proper." 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1982).
·
104. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 31, at 579-80; Note, supra note 31, at 970; Recent
Decision, supra note 89, at 799-800; cf. Note, Remedial Gap at the NLRB Following the
Demise of the Nonmajority Bargaining Order: Gourmet Foods, Inc. and Warehouse Employees, Local 503, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1193, 1208-17 (1985) (suggesting alternative remedial devices to be applied by the Board assuming the NMBO remedy never again will be
available).
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showing of a card majority. 1011 Therefore, NMBOs appear to be
the only effective way to remedy severe employer unfair labor
practices. On balance, they best ensure employee freedom of
choice in these situations. 106

B. Deterrence of Employer Unfajr Labor Practices
A second policy goal that NMBOs further is the deterrence of
employer unfair labor practices. The threat of having an NMBO
imposed should create a strong incentive for an anti-union employer to keep his opposition to the union within the law. If he
does not do so, he may b~ forced to bargain with the union anyway, even if his unfair labor practices successfully keep the
union from winning the election or obtaining a cardholder majority.107 On the other hand, in the absence of the threat of an
NMBO, an anti-union employer may risk committing serious
unfair labor practices at the first signs of unionization, so as to
prevent the union from acquiring a cardholder majority and
thereby ensure that he will never be subject to a bargaining
order. 108
105. See Recent Case, supra note 45, at 832 & n.125.
106. See, e.g., Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald,
J., dissenting); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1068 (3d Cir.
1980); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 594 (1984) (Member Zimmerman, dissenting); Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1194 (1982); Bok, supra note 26, at 138 & n.274;
Recent Case, supra note 45, at 831-32.
107. Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1400 (Wald, J., dissenting) ("The prospect of a remedial bargaining order should create a strong incentive for the anti-union employer to
keep its campaign within legal limits. For even if the company wins the organizational
battle, it may lose the collective bargaining war."); see also Gourmet Foods, 270
N.L.R.B. at 593 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n,
242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1037-38 (1979) (Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Bok, supra note 26, at 133.
108. If the Board is not allowed to issue NMBOs:
The anti-union employer can avoid ever dealing with a union by rushing in at
the first sign of union sentiment, before employees have begun to experience the
collective strength of numbers, with threats of plant closings, mass discharges
and close surveillance, thereby creating an atmosphere of coercion that outlasts
the tenure of current employees and outdistances the remedial powers of the
Board.
Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1400 (Wald, J., dissenting). In addition:
If the Board could enter only a cease-and-desist order and direct an election or a
rerun, it would in effect he rewarding the employer and allowing him "to profit
from [his) own wrongful refusal to bargain," while at the same time severely
curtailing the employees' right freely to determine whether they desire a representative. The employer could continue to delay or disrupt the election processes
and put off indefinitely his obligation to bargain; and any election held under
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Although one could argue that NMBOs are an ineffective remedy, and therefore that their deterrent effect would prove to be
illusory, the experience with the bargaining order in general offers strong evidence· to the contrary. Those who contend that
NMBOs are ineffective remedies point out that NMBOs cannot
compel a recalcitrant employer to make any concessions or agree
to a contract. 109 In addition, the employees probably would be
unable to utilize the strike weapon, because employees who are
too intimidated to vote for the union in a secret ballot election
would be unlikely to vote to go on strike. 110 Therefore, they conclude, because NMBOs are unlikely to produce viable and enduring collective bargaining relationships, employers would have
no real incentive to avoid them. 111 Past experience with the bargaining order remedy in general, however, suggests that such an
incentive indeed exists. Employers have fought the bargaining
order remedy with considerable tenacity, indicating that they
consider the possibility of meaningful bargaining to be substantial.112 Therefore, the threat of an NMBO may effectively deter
employer unfair labor practices and possibly even result in longlasting collective bargaining relationships.
CONCLUSION

Under current Board policy no effective remedy exists for pervasive employer unfair labor practices during a union organizing
campaign. Traditional Board remedies often cannot fully eliminate the coercive effects of these extreme unfair labor practices.
Particularly when a union has come close to obtaining a cardthese circumstances would not be likely to demonstrate the employees' true, undistorted desires.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-11 (1969) (citation and footnotes omitted) (quoting Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944)); see also United Dairy
Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 633 F.2d at 1068-69; Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. at 593 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026,
1037 (1979) (Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Golub, supra note 26, at 637-38; Note, supra note 31, at 968 & n.93.
109. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
110. Cf. Weiler, supra note 90, at 1794-95 (discussing the alleged ineffectiveness of
Gissel bargaining orders).
111. See id. at 1795; Hunter, supra note 31, at 580. A statistical study concluded that
Gissel bargaining orders have less than a 10% chance of producing a lasting collective
bargaining relationship. R. O'Shea, Gissel Bargaining Orders (May 1982) (unpublished
LL.M. thesis available in Harvard Law School Library) (cited in Weiler, supra note 90,
at 1795 n.94).
112. See Bok, supra note 26, at 137.
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holder majority, the employer's unfair labor practices may have
been sufficient to deter enough pro-union votes so as to defeat a
union that would have won a representation election in a coercion-free environment.
Board acceptance and careful application of the NMBO remedy would largely solve this problem. The bargaining order
would, by definition, erase the effects of employer unfair labor
practices that have caused a union to lose a certification election. The Act's broad grant of remedial power to the Board,
combined with the flexibility of the majority rule principle, is
sufficient to support the Board's statutory authority to issue
NMBOs. The Supreme Court's implicit approval of NMBOs in
Gissel strengthens this view. Furthermore, NMBOs, if carefully
applied, would further the Act's policy of effectuating employee
free choice and, in addition, be likely to deter employer unfair
labor practices in the first place.
The Board, therefore, should reverse its current policy and begin issuing bargaining orders when it determines that a union
would have won a cer_tification election "but for" the employer's
unfair labor practices. In making this determination, the Board
should take into account both the severity of the employer's unfair labor practices and objective evidence of the extent of union
support among the employees prior to the employer's unfair labor practices. In addition, the Supreme Court, in order to resolve the current confusion in this area, should explicitly approve the Board's use of NMBOs at the next available
opportunity.

-David S. Skillman

